Beslan Counter-terrorism Incident Command: Lessons Learned by Forster, Peter K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive





Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Homeland Security Affairs (October 2006), v.2 no.3
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25075
Beslan: Counter-terrorism Incident Command:  
Lessons Learned 
 
Dr. Peter K. Forster 
  
 
In July 2006, Russian officials announced that Shamil Basaev, the Chechen extremist 
guerilla leader who masterminded some of the most notorious terrorist acts against 
Russia, had been killed. Although the long-term impact of Basaev’s death, much like 
that of Abu al-Zarqawi in Iraq, remains to be seen, it does represent a significant success 
for the Russian government. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity to renew interest 
in the lessons learned from the attack in Beslan, perhaps Basaev’s most notorious 
operation. 
From September 1 – 3, 2004, Russia experienced a tragedy as damaging to its 
national psyche as the 9/11 attacks were to the United States’ three years prior. A 
terrorist assault on School Number 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia resulted in more than 300 
hostages, including 186 children, perishing as the Federal Security Service 
(Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnozi  or FSB) attempted to rescue them by storming the 
school. Beslan represents a complex incident that exposed significant failures in 
preventing terrorist situations through the mismanagement of intelligence. 
Furthermore, it offers insight into the effect that past events have on decisions made 
during terrorism crises, the “fog of war” that influences decision-making in counter-
terrorism operations, and the failure of effective incident command that results in mis-
managed objectives, ineffective transfer and chain of command, and errors in the 
dissemination of public information and intelligence. All of these contributed to the 
tragedy. This article critiques the Russian government’s efforts at prevention, 
protection, and response to arrive at the lessons learned. It then proceeds to explain 
how some of these lessons might be applied to improve anti- and counter-terrorism 
operations in the United States. 
The on-going Chechen conflict has created a range of political and security concerns 
for Russia. The first, and perhaps greatest, of these is that Russia’s improved 
suppression of insurgent actions in Chechnya has facilitated the conflict’s migration into 
other parts of the North Caucasus. Second, in addition to perpetrating attacks across the 
North Caucasus region, the insurgents have demonstrated a capability to execute 
terrorist operations as far away as Moscow, further embarrassing the Putin government 
and spreading insecurity among the population. Third, the terrorist assault on a Beslan 
school was another in a series of deadly attacks by secessionist and Islamic extremists 
seeking to oust the Russians from North Caucasus and was representative of the 
Chechen conflict’s trademark reliance on “catastrophic terrorism.”1 Previous attacks had 
resulted in eighty killed and 106 wounded in a raid on a Ministry of Interior 
(Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del or MVD) armory in Nazran, Ingushetia in June 2004; 
forty killed by an alleged suicide bomber in the Moscow subway in February 2004; and 
129 killed during an FSB rescue attempt at the Dubrovka Theater in October 2002. 
Undoubtedly, these experiences influenced the response at Beslan.      
The Beslan siege started on September 1, 2004, when terrorists, primarily ethnic 
Ingush and Chechens, seized School Number 1 and created a tactical and strategic 
dilemma for the Russian government. After seizing the hostages, the terrorists 
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demanded the release of prisoners captured during the Nazran raid and the complete 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. To prove their resolve, the terrorists 
executed nearly twenty adult male hostages during the first day.  
The initial failure in the Beslan incident occurred when local authorities failed to 
execute an effective anti-terrorism strategy. Prevention and protection require a strategy 
based on deterrence and intelligence. Deterrence seeks to make the cost of terrorist 
action too high and intelligence informs authorities of possibilities, thus enabling them 
to prioritize the implementation of deterrent measures. The efficient gathering, analysis, 
dissemination, and, ultimately, use of intelligence is crucial in identifying potential 
threats, prioritizing their credibility, and deploying counter-measures. Operationally, 
Russian security forces failed to deter the incursion into North Ossetia or to make 
potential targets unattractive by increasing protection. The terrorists’ ability to infiltrate 
North Ossetia and the town of Beslan indicated that border control was ineffective or 
may have been compromised, as some suggest.2 Considering the existing hostilities, the 
lack of more stringent border control is hard to understand and may give credence to a 
conspiracy theory. Furthermore, intelligence was misinterpreted or not used. In spite of 
arresting a potential collaborator (who disclosed the possibility of school attacks) and 
indications from local sources as early as August 28 that rebels had penetrated Beslan, 
no local counter-measures were implemented. No police were deployed near the school 
nor did authorities take more extreme measures such as canceling or “locking down” the 
schools.3  
Compounding these operational mistakes was a strategic failure on the part of 
Russian security forces to become a learning organization. The Beslan crisis exposed the 
limits of integrating prior experiences into institutional learning within Russian 
intelligence and security forces, thus precluding enhanced preparedness. Russian 
intelligence forces did not exhibit “out of the box” thinking that might have recognized 
connections among terrorist operations or have assisted them in identifying linkages 
between non-combatant targets. Terrorists seek to have their attacks impact society’s 
psyche or, more precisely, make the secure seem insecure. In June 1995 Basaev seized 
the city hospital in Budennovsk, Dagestan. After negotiations, Basaev’s forces were 
allowed to return to Chechnya, leaving behind 147 dead hostages.4 Intuitively, a linkage 
between taking over a hospital and taking over a school is clear both from a societal and 
terrorist perspective. Society perceives both as offering security, safety, and a sense of 
care; striking a school or hospital exposes society’s fundamental vulnerability to 
terrorism. In any case, schools do not appear to have been identified as future targets 
following Budennovsk. 
While the connection to Budennovsk required sophisticated counter-terrorism 
analysis, the failure to properly assess the Nazran raid, also coordinated by Basaev, 
better illuminates an apparently compartmentalized, rather than holistic, approach to 
counter-terrorism. The Nazran raid took place on June 21, 2004. It was the first “large 
scale” rebel infantry attack in several years and the first outside of Chechnya since 
1999.5  Threatening and attacking targets outside of Chechnya was a shift in strategy  
missed by Russian intelligence. Second, no thought was given to the fact the raid might 
have offered either an opportunity to test deterrent measures or acquire weaponry for a 
future attack. The failure to effectively analyze the objectives of the Nazran raid is 
particularly evident because the armory target had insignificant psychological or 
publicity value. Thus, the attack had other objectives. A broader assessment of Nazran 
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may have produced sufficient information to raise the threat awareness level elsewhere 
in the North Caucasus.  
When deterrence failed at Beslan, the Russian government reacted. Response is 
influenced by broader political agendas, past experiences, and local events; at Beslan, 
government frustration over another hostage situation converged with a perceived 
opportunity to recover the prestige it had lost from the costly counter-terrorist 
operations at Nazran and the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. Since the Dubrovka Theater 
incident, government patience to negotiate a resolution had waned. At Nazran, for 
example, negotiations were not pursued even though they may have proved fruitful, 
particularly since the raid was not a suicide mission.6 At Beslan, the Russian 
government shied away from a negotiated settlement and focused instead on a military 
solution. This preference was evident in the arrival of General Vladimir Pronichev, the 
operational commander of the Dubrovka Theater rescue, and in the rhetoric and 
planning of the FSB response team. Furthermore, the public relations spin portraying 
the terrorists as crazed extremists sought to engender public support for military action. 
Third, the FSB’s request for tanks and APCs to augment spetsnaz units already deployed 
signaled a commitment to a military operation. Securing the release of the hostages 
appeared to blend with improving a diminished public perception of FSB competency, 
and thus resulted in an FSB commitment to using force to improve the FBS’s public 
image while securing the hostages’ release.    
Although one cannot advocate acquiescence to terrorist demands (e.g. releasing the 
prisoners captured during the Nazran raid, as was demanded by the Beslan 
perpetrators) entering into serious negotiations should have been considered, 
particularly given the directly relevant and ancillary information available. Again, 
Russian security analysts failed to thoroughly scrutinize the incident and instead 
accepted the premise that an assault would be needed. In the case of Beslan, their 
decision may be justifiable. The situation deteriorated quickly with the execution of 
hostages, which warranted an immediate response. However, security forces did not 
respond. The question is “why not?” The most plausible answers revolve around three 
issues.  First, it appears that since Putin was on vacation on the Black Sea and returned 
to Moscow before issuing orders, no one had the authority to authorize action.  
Considering the Soviet legacy of centralized command, Putin’s unavailability is a 
legitimate reason for not responding. The second reason relates to readiness.  The forces 
on site were not sufficient in number or preparedness to execute an attack. The third 
reason is that on-site officials believed that, with bombs placed in the school (a point 
that was communicated at the outset of the crisis), an attack might result in the 
terrorists initiating a suicide mission that would kill all hostages.7 
They based their assessment on the fact that, in spite of efforts to negotiate in 
previous cases (Budennovsk, Dubrovka Theater, and Nazran), deaths still resulted. 
Moreover, in the latter two circumstances, assaults were ultimately needed to try to free 
the hostages. What officials on site at Beslan missed was that at the Dubrovka Theater 
negotiations prior to the assault had resulted in some hostages being released, 
undoubtedly saving their lives. In hostage situations, negotiations serve multiple 
purposes.  One is certainly to facilitate the release of some hostages and perhaps achieve 
a non-violent resolution to the crisis. At Beslan some moderates advocated negotiations, 
hoping they might result in the release of some of the children.8 Second, the time 
needed to conduct negotiations increases the pressure on the hostage takers. It extends 
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the length of time they need to guard the prisoners, stay awake, and protect their 
perimeter. Third, it increases the time frame in which law enforcement and military 
units can acquire intelligence and refine a rescue plan. The time gained from negotiation 
represents an advantage that should not be quickly discarded by security forces. 
These errors in judgment were exacerbated by operational and tactical mistakes. 
Notwithstanding the trauma of day one, the incident did stabilize to some extent. While 
concerns of a suicide attack undoubtedly were piqued during that first day, it should 
have become apparent that while a suicide operation remained an option for the 
terrorists, it was not their primary plan. As critical as misinterpreting the perpetrators’ 
intent was the security forces’ failure to achieve situational awareness. Security forces 
underestimated both the number of hostages and terrorists.9 The inaccuracy of these 
estimates provided an unrealistic picture of the situation, negatively impacted the 
effectiveness of planning and logistically coordinating the counter-assault, and 
undoubtedly reinforced the unrealistic belief that using force was less risky.  
Further operational mistakes were made in establishing and maintaining clear 
incident command. Incident command is responsible for defining the operating 
characteristics, interactive management components, and structure of responding units 
during the incident.10 Upon their arrival on the scene, overall command was vested in 
the FSB. While transfer of command is often authorized in complex multi-agency 
circumstances, the FSB failed to execute their leadership responsibility in this instance. 
When transferring command, essential information needs to be transferred as well.11 
The FSB did not seek a briefing from the MVD commander (the previous incident 
commander) who had deployed forces. It also ignored local expertise that might have 
been able to provide valuable situational, as well as environmental, intelligence. 
Meanwhile, the confrontational tone of public information releases did little to assist the 
security forces; it further alienated the terrorists, lessening the chance for negotiations 
and diminishing the opportunity to surprise the terrorists with a rescue attempt. 
The impact of these operational oversights probably was minimized by the decision to 
forego potentially lengthy negotiations and resort to the use of force. However, other 
tactical decisions, such as minimally securing the site and choice of weaponry for the 
assault, did impact the situation. Whether malfeasance or simply misfeasance, 
neglecting to establish a secure cordon around the incident allowed unauthorized and 
armed vigilante groups to gain close proximity to school. This jeopardized operational 
command, planning, and ultimately discipline, which became apparent when the initial 
shots were fired absent a proper command.12 The choice to use incendiary RPGs and 
tanks, reminiscent of the U.S. federal raid on Waco, ensured military effectiveness in 
terms of eradicating the terrorists’ presence in the structure, but did little to minimize 
collateral casualties; weapons capable of high lethality have trouble differentiating 
between hostages and perpetrators but are effective killers. 
The means used to recover from an event is important as well. Terrorist attacks 
shake societal confidence in government’s ability to provide protection. In the recovery 
process, government cover-ups, such as those that occurred in the aftermath of Beslan, 
are counter-productive. Although some independent investigations occurred, none was 
commissioned by the Russian government. Nor is there any indication the Russian 
government accepted any of the findings. Many in government rationalized the Beslan 
cover-up on the basis that full disclosure of the activities surrounding the crisis might 
have ignited ethnic violence between Ingush and Chechens bent on revenge killings. 
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Others were simply unwilling to publicize another embarrassment involving a less-than-
effective response by the security forces. What became most apparent in the time 
following the Beslan incident was that the government was unwilling to accept that 
mistakes were made. Although any assessment of the incident uncovers glaring mistakes 
at various stages of the operation, the re-assignment of the primary incident 
commanders to posts that could only be considered promotions indicates the 
government did not see significant errors in their approach. For example, Pronichev is 
now the First Deputy Director of the FSB.  
 
Only the realistic assessment of an incident encourages a learning organization and so 
facilitates the prevention of, and response, to further attacks. Objective assessments 
should identify gaps in policies and encourage responsible organizations to develop and 
implement means to close those gaps. The Report of the 9/11 Commission, the National 
Response Plan, and the Nationwide Plan Review are intended to provide such 
encouragement in the United States. In Russia, the Nalchik raid in October 2005 
illustrates the risks of failing to embrace a learning organization concept. Security forces 
failed to identify and correct the gaps that allowed Beslan to occur and the perpetrators 
to escape. Even though security forces had advance notice of the raids and deployed 
“hundreds of special forces” prior to it, they failed to stop the incursion.13 And, although 
security forces did succeed in inflicting significant casualties on the insurgents at 
Nalchik, many escaped – just as they did at Beslan. Although no hostages were involved 
in the Nalchik raid, the execution of the counter-terrorism operation demonstrated poor 
use of intelligence and inadequate planning.  
Beslan’s failures transcend this incident and provide empirical evidence on how to 
improve anti- and counter-terrorism operations. From an American perspective, some 
of the failures are addressed in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
the Nationwide Plan Review, while others are broader.14 Their effectiveness remains to 
be evaluated. At a strategic level, discriminate assessment of prior events, both recent 
and long-term, allows the organizations responsible for prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery to enhance anticipation, identify gaps in preventative measures, 
and improve response operations. To achieve this objective, it is important first to 
critically examine the actual and potential purposes of past incidents. For example, did 
an attack have military, political, socio-psychological, operational, or economic goals? 
The goals at Nazran were primarily military and operational. It provided weaponry for 
future attacks as well as developing the terrorists’ operational knowledge of weaknesses 
in preventative measures and how security forces might respond. An assessment of 
Nazran should have increased awareness of the weaknesses in border control and 
deficiencies in timely response. At a minimum, it should have increased threat 
awareness. Second, effective analysis should consider the extent to which objectives 
were met in the operation. The level of success may provide an indication of whether 
another incident is worthwhile. Third, it is important to assess whether the success or 
failure of previous events may be incentives for future actions. Has success emboldened 
potential perpetrators? What is the impact of failure? For example, might the failure to 
successfully execute an attack force a terrorist group to try again in the near term to 
maintain its legitimacy, or to re-group and spend additional time planning?   
Operationally, a number of salient points emerge. Multiple variables influence the 
response to a catastrophic event. A level of objectivity needs to be maintained to allow 
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those coordinating the response to differentiate among political agendas, past 
experiences, and events on the ground. Past experiences and political agendas have a 
role to play in formulating a strategy but it is important to recognize that while events 
may be linked, each has unique characteristics and variables that require unique crisis 
management. Second, responding forces need to be discriminating in their method of 
response and selection of weaponry. Russian security forces need to achieve more 
operational restraint, which is a factor of command and planning. In the Dubrovka 
Theater, Nazran, and Beslan counter-assaults, security forces were directly or indirectly 
responsible for nearly 500 deaths. This is a training and command issue. Nothing 
substitutes for exercises in preparing security forces and other first responders for the 
pressures associated with a high-stress event.   
All options need to be considered in responding to events. After the initial executions, 
subsequent events at Beslan did not indicate a suicide attack was in progress. If a suicide 
attack was planned, why did the terrorists not immediately blow up the school after 
penetrating the perimeter? Given this reasoning, other options should have been 
explored. Units responding to a terrorist incident need to understand the “nature of  the 
beast” (i.e., the perpetrators and their motives); this will better prepare the command to 
determine whether an incident requires the immediate use of force or restraint.  
Negotiations can be essential in this process. They increase the time to gather and 
access intelligence to determine who the terrorists are and their objectives. Moreover, 
negotiations provide time to plan an effective response and secure the area to minimize 
collateral damage and avoid vigilantism.  
This latter point becomes increasingly important in emotionally-driven incidents 
where terrorists threaten or attack schools and other facilities that serve children or the 
weak and incapacitated. These targets have a high psychological value and such attacks 
shake society’s sense of security and thus may encourage the general population to seek 
resolution on their own.   
Poor multi-agency coordination hinders effective assessment of the crisis 
environment. At Beslan, local assistance and expertise was disregarded. To be effective 
security forces need to be cognizant that, as in combat, terrorist situations have a “fog of 
war” surrounding them.  Effective use of intelligence is needed to lift the “fog” to the 
greatest extent possible. This is accomplished by utilizing all available resources. Local 
resources can be particularly valuable in data fusion because they are familiar with the 
environment. Furthermore, effective incident command requires flexibility in the 
planning and execution of operations, not only to respond to unexpected events at the 
incident but also to achieve a level of control ensuring official actions are not overtaken 
by outside events (as occurred with the vigilantism at Beslan).  
Finally, lessons learned at the tactical level may be applied to prevention as well as 
response. “All response is local” is the mantra of American emergency response. Thus, 
the Department of Homeland Security’s list of 77,069 high-risk sites does not include 
many potential targets such as schools, hospitals, or local sports facilities. The DHS list 
presumes that local and regional authorities will assume the responsibility for 
protecting these venues. Local authorities need to have appropriate response plans and 
be prepared to request additional assistance if needed. At Beslan, local authorities were 
unprepared to respond to the crisis, even though they had intelligence indicating an 
elevated threat level. They had insufficient personnel and equipment. An additional 
question, beyond the scope of this paper but warranting further research, is what caused 
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the ineffective response? Might it be attributed to multiple priorities, incompetence, or 
perhaps even a level of cooperation between law enforcement and the perpetrators? The 
collusion suggested by this last point is the most disconcerting, but it needs to be 
considered in circumstances in which local law enforcement is under-paid, poorly 
trained, and might have religious, ethnic, or familial ties to the perpetrators. 
 
In conclusion, the Beslan tragedy provides a case study on how to improve the strategic, 
operational, and tactical prevention of, and response to, a terrorist incident. It clearly 
demonstrates the importance of intelligence and analysis both as a part of prevention 
and in reducing the “fog of war” inherent to response.  Finally, it shows how political 
agendas and past events can complicate the response to the incident at hand, including 
decisions surrounding incident command, transfer of power, and ultimately the method 
of response.  
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